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We study 79 sets of bylaw provisions adopted by Norwegian corporations in a free 
contracting environment before Norway got its first corporate law. The firms in our 
sample are publicly traded companies in the period 1900-1910. We document substantial 
protections to minority shareholders against expropriation by insiders and observe 
considerable heterogeneity in the investor protections stipulated in the contracts with 
regards to board structure, director responsibilities and remuneration, disclosure of 
company information, and shareholder voting rights, among others. We find that firms 
seem to self-select bylaw protections and show that firms with dispersed control 
structures tend to operate with protections reflecting collective action and free-rider 
problems, whereas tightly controlled firms have bylaws in place that reflect the relatively 
sophistication of investors. We also find evidence that dividends and investor protections 
are substitutes, and that firms in high growth industries and firms that issue equity 
disclose more information to investors. We conclude that effective governance systems 
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In the highly influential papers written by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998, 1999, 2000; together denoted ―LLSV‖), statutory corporate law plays a 
central role in the development of effective corporate governance systems within a 
country. Investors are protected by the rights corporate securities assign to their owners, 
but the strength of these rights depend in turn on legal rules and the extent to which law 
protects shareholders and creditors from expropriation by company insiders. 
LLSV show that differences in investor protections contained in corporate law 
may be the cause of differences in the financing patterns of firms across the world—in 
particular, the concentration of equity ownership tends to be high when shareholder 
protection is weak, i.e. the concentration of control acts as an alternative governance 
mechanisms in place of law to protect investors. Widely held firms will, therefore, not 
arise without strong corporate laws.  
Recent work by Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009), however, takes issue with this 
point. They show that U.K. companies exhibited traits of dispersed ownership prior to the 
existence of strong corporate law in the United Kingdom and argue that law seems to 
have had little to do with ownership structure and the development of the U.K. financial 
sector more generally. Similarly, Cheffins (2006) argues that the arm’s-length system of 
ownership and control became entrenched in the U.K. during a period when Britain had 
―mediocre‖ corporate and securities legislation.  
The statutory laws discussed by LLSV, Cheffins,  Franks et al., essentially impose 
the same corporate contract on all firms within a given country. In this paper, we study 
instead firms incorporate in a single country during a period with no corporate law. When 
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the equity capital providers to the firm are free to design the corporate contract that 
applies between them, what governance mechanisms do they choose? In such a ―free‖ 
contracting regime, do we continue to observe a systematic relationship between the 
distribution of control rights and law?   
In this paper, we study 79 sets of bylaw provisions adopted by turn-of-the century 
Norwegian publicly traded corporations and document substantial protections to minority 
shareholders against expropriation by insiders. Indeed, the primary function of these 
corporate contracts appears to have to been to establish basic protections for outside and 
minority investors from encroachment by insiders. What makes our analysis unique is 
that at the time of the contracts we observe (the early 1900s), no statutory corporate law 
existed in Norway. Thus, the formal contractual protections that we observe in the 
Norwegian corporate bylaws existed long before corporate governance became part of 
the modern vernacular—the contracts arose endogenously in a free contracting 
environment limited at the time to Norway, Denmark and three Hanseatic towns in 
Germany. To our knowledge, we are the first scholarly work to bring together original 
legal source material in order to sketch the business legal environment at that time. 
We observe large heterogeneity in the contracts, including a variety of different 
board structures, mechanisms for controlling directors' behavior, disclosure policies, and 
allocations of control and voting rights. The cross-sectional variation in the contracts that 
we observe is substantially larger than the variation observed in today's corporate bylaws. 
The fact that all the firms in our sample reside in the same country, makes the study of 
the protections in the cross-section especially apt.  
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The firms in our sample rely mostly on equity finance.
1
 Equity-holders' control 
rights—their ability to vote—is their protection from insiders running the firm (Hart 
(1995)). It is a striking characteristic of these early contracts that the allocation of voting 
rights across shareholders varies considerably across firms. Also, voting scales tend to be 
graduated and maximum vote provisions apply.
2
 Rather than allocating one vote per 
share, turn-of-the century Norwegian corporations often endowed smaller shareholders 
with marginally larger voting rights. We also document considerable variation in share 
size, with some sizes prohibitively large for small investors. Hence, though their choice 
of voting rights and share size, firms were essentially designed to have a dispersed or 
concentrated shareholder population.  We label these, respectively, inclusive and 
exclusive firms.  
We are able to document the existence of a systematic relationship between the 
structure of shareholder control and governance laws, in particular, systematic differences 
exist between firms with concentrated and dispersed control structures. Thus we 
document a relationship between equity control and law as do LLSV, but our relationship 
is more complex: Rather than having weak investor protection, exclusive firms have in 
place different investor protections compared to the firms where control is dispersed.  We 
argue that firms simultaneously choose control and governance laws structures, that is, 
the two structures are determined endogenously. This suggests that the one-rule-fits-all 
characteristics of statutory corporate law may impose costs on firms as shareholders are 
prevented from designing contracts that are optimally adjusted to the particular 
characteristics and circumstances of the individual firm.  
                                                 
1
 It is a well-documented characteristic that corporations at this point in time tended to use more equity than 
debt finance, see for example Baskin (1988), and Franks, Mayer, and Wagner (2006). 
2
 Musacchio (2008) finds a similar pattern of voting rights in Brazilian corporations before 1910. 
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More specifically, we find that inclusive firms have in place protections that 
reflect the presence of free-rider and collective action problems among shareholders: 
These firms more often have shareholder supervisory boards and they control directors by 
requiring that directors be shareholders in the firm. It is relatively easy for shareholders to 
raise extraordinary issues at the general assembly or call extraordinary meetings. In 
contrast, exclusive firms have in place structures that appear to reflect the presence of a 
smaller circle of relatively sophisticated shareholders. They tend not to have shareholder 
boards and they monitor directors by imposing stricter requirements on their reporting to 
shareholders. Requirements for extraordinary meetings are relatively more stringent, but 
shareholders are more actively involved in decision-making that may prevent the 
tunneling of assets by insiders.  
We relate the bylaw protections to two important corporate decisions: The 
payment of dividends and the raising of new equity capital. Baskin (1988) emphasizes 
how the payment of dividends helped sustain the confidence of poorly informed investors 
during the early phases of industrialization. We regress the fraction of dividends paid out 
of annual surplus on indices summarizing the strength of different bylaw protections and 
find that a higher degree of shareholder control is negatively associated with dividend 
payments, especially when considering bylaws associated with shareholders’ control over 
directors and their ability to bring extraordinary cases for the general assembly. Our 
interpretation of this result is that lower control rights require the payment of higher 
dividends, that is, the dividend payments serve as a substitute to a contractual 
commitment not to steal cash in the firm. Since the payment of dividends reduces the size 
of assets under insiders’ control and increases the need to access capital markets in the 
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future, the payment of dividends is costly for insiders enjoying private benefits of control. 
This makes dividends credible signaling that insiders will not expropriate minority 
shareholders. In addition, fluctuations in firms’ dividend-payments may provide 
information to asymmetrically informed investors (Cheffin (2006)).  Our results are 
therefore consistent with the ``substitute model‖ proposed by LLSV (2000) in which 
insiders use dividends as a signaling device. The analysis in LLSV (2000), in contrast, 
finds that higher dividends are associated with stronger minority protection.   
We further find that the substitution ratio of dividends for control is larger for 
exclusive firms, such that one index unit of extra control to shareholders lowers dividend-
payout by a larger amount compared to the average firm, in other words, a unit of 
shareholder control is more potent in firms with concentrated control structures. A similar 
effect does not exist for the group of inclusive firms.  
Regressions of capital-raising intensity on bylaw protection indices reveal that the 
expansion of equity capital is positively related to bylaws that further shareholders' 
access to company financial accounts and materials. This results should be seen in the 
light of the absence of a corporate law that ensured shareholders’ access to such 
information—indeed, contemporary editorials in Norwegian business magazines reveal 
that companies generally regarded matters relating to the business and its success as 
sensitive and were often unwilling engage in public communication of such issues.
3
 As 
pointed out by Cheffins (2006), disclosure regulation may act as a substitute for securities 
law. In relation to our sample, of course, it is important that such disclosure regulation 
were imposed at the individual firm-level by the founding shareholders themselves.  
                                                 
3
 Such anecdotal evidence may be found in the Farmand business magazine. 
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Our results also add insights to the work of Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) on 
early 20th-century U.K. firms. Finding that corporate law seem to have little to do with 
the ownership structure  in these companies, they speculate that the firms' governance 
mechanisms were developed via informal relationships and trust between investors and 
insiders located in close geographic proximity to each other. Our results suggest than an 
alternative formal mechanism for strong corporate governance may have been operating 
at that time, namely enforceable firm-specific contracts. These contractual bylaws may 
either have been enforced in courts or through reputation. Our results that dividends may 
act as a substitute for corporate law is consistent with Cheffins’ (2006) proposition that 
the dividend policy was a vehicle for the separation of ownership and control in U.K. 
public companies.   
Our observation that corporate bylaws can protect shareholders in place of 
corporate law is far from novel.  Building on the work of Coase (1988), Easterbrook and 
Fischel (1991) argue that the very foundation of corporate governance builds on the 
collection of contracts made between the parties of a corporation.  Corporations, as 
capital raisers, seek to write contracts that minimize the agency costs related to raising 
capital from outside investors, with competition among the capital raisers leading to 
optimal contracts with investors.  Corporate law, when it exists, provides a ―standard 
form‖ contract that reduces transactions costs.  This ―contractarian‖ view of corporate 
governance and law remains a central focal point for debate among law and economics 
scholars. Similarly, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2002) note that ―corporations are 




 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides background 
information about the legal framework in Norway at the time of our sample. Section III 
describes the data collection process and provides some summary information about the 
firms in our dataset.  Section IV provides summary statistics across the contracts on the 
sets of protections and Section V presents ours results. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Legal Framework in Norway Prior to 1911 
Prior to the 20
th
 century, corporations, partnerships, and other similar business 
forms in Norway and Denmark could be created freely without regard to codified 
regulations or law.   The companies were recognized by the judicial system as a separate 
legal person without government concession or charter.  Originally, government 
concessions were deemed necessary only when a company asked for special (e.g., 
monopoly) privileges.
 4
 This legal custom was carried over to limited liability companies 
as they started to emerge in large numbers in the economic boom years of the 1840s 
(Villars-Dahl, 1984; Dübeck, 1991).  
Although prior to 1911 no statutory law existed to regulate the corporate form of 
business in Norway, a variety of legal precedents and standards existed to guide lawyers 
and judges through corporate legal disputes.  This body of ―unwritten‖ corporate law 
started with legal customs or norms (sedvanerett) established through centuries of 
dispute-resolution, primarily in the areas of property rights and contract law.
5
  At their 
roots, these norms were likely influenced both by Old Norse property rights traditions 
                                                 
4
The Danish Supreme Court ruled in 1827 that private associations could be recognized as separate legal 
entities without government approval (Danish Committee on Comparative Law, 1963). By 1824, Danish 
authorities (Kancelliet) had also published a statement that made precise that only privileges of 
―monopolistic and extraordinary‖ character required government concession (Lübeck, 1991). 
5
 Nygaard (2004) provides a critical overview of the foundations and practice of law in Norway.  
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and the medieval Law Merchant (Lex Mercatoria) that prevailed in Hanseatic cities.
6
  
Further guidance was provided by basic legal principles (almennelige rettsprinsipper) 
that evolved within the legal community, by and among the lawyers and judges that were 
engaged in private law during this period.  Hallager (1844), for instance, produced a large 
and detailed volume detailing the basic legal principles behind the rights of parties in 
contractual disputes, in particular, disputes involving creditors and a debtor.  Finally, 
legal precedents set in court (rettspraksis) contributed to the body of unwritten corporate 
law prior to 1910.  While past court decisions in Norway did not take on the central role 
of creating common law as in the Anglo-Saxon countries, they were a valid input to 
current disputes, and – in the absence of relevant written law – could be used together 
with norms and principals to inform judicial decisions. 
Beyond the legal precedents and standards that prevailed at the end of the 19
th
 
century, Norwegian corporations were subject to one set of statutory regulations, so-
called ―registration laws.‖  The precedent for registering businesses dates back to a 1681 
Danish law that required registration in a court (tinglysning or tinglæsning) to make 
contracts legally binding vis-à-vis third parties.  The laws required all commercial 
entities, regardless of organizational form, to register their business into a legal court 
record and to disclose this registration to the ―public.‖  
The first business registration law (Lov om Firmaregistre) was enacted in Norway 
in 1874, only to be replaced with a more extensive law in 1890 (Lov om  Handelsregister, 
Firma, og Prokura).  The 1890 law required a business to make a one-time disclosure 
that included the firm’s the founding date, a brief description of the business, the county 
in which the company was headquartered, the amount of equity capital in the company, 
                                                 
6
 For a discussion of the Law Merchant, see Trakman (1983) and Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990). 
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how the capital was divided among the owners, whether ownership shares were written in 
the owner’s name or as ―bearer‖ shares, and whether issued shares were paid in full.  The 
disclosure was also supposed to indicate whether the firm would make periodic 
disclosures, and if so, in which newspapers, and include the founding company 
manager’s full name and address, and who has the responsibility for signing the 
company’s name.  Finally, the disclosure required that the company’s bylaws or articles 
be submitted as an attachment, along with proof of identification of the founding 
managers (Beichmann, 1890).  Disclosures were to be published in a timely fashion in an 
official government periodical, Norsk Kundgjørelsestidende.   
In sum, one can make several observations about the legal environment in 
Norway as of 1900.  First, there was no statutory corporate law in place.  That is, no 
legislation had been enacted to regulate how a limited-liability, commercial entity should 
be organized; how it should be capitalized and managed, or how shareholders should be 
granted control rights over its assets.  In virtually every peer country at the time, 
including Sweden, the U.K., the countries across the European continent, and the states of 
America, laws were in place to regulate and restrict the business form known as a 
―corporation.‖  Second, Norway did have strong and longstanding ―extra-legal‖ 
mechanisms for adjudicating contractual disputes, and for requiring companies of all 
forms to publicly disclose rudimentary information about the business at the time it was 
founded.  These traditions arose to facilitate contracting with third-parties (e.g., 





III. Data Collection Process 
 
We draw on the first volume of Carl Kierulf’s Handbook of Norwegian Bonds 
and Stocks (Haandbog over Norske Obligationer og Aktier) from the year 1900 and 
archives from Norway’s company registration service, Brønnøysundregistrene, to collect 
information from the bylaws of publicly traded Norwegian companies.  The first volume 
of the Handbook includes the bylaws as well as limited accounting and market 
information on 145 companies.  According to Kierulf, these companies regularly 
appeared on the price lists circulated by Oslo brokers, and thus were considered to be the 
most liquid. The shares of industrial corporations were traded off-the-counter as the first 
industrial company to be listed on the official Oslo Stock Exchange was only listed in 
1909.   The ―broker’s list‖ (meglerliste) was considered to be the definitive list of 
tradeable companies.
7
  Our sample excludes banks and insurance companies and 
railroads.  Railroad companies are excluded because they were partly owned by local 
county governments and appear to have included state interference.  This leaves us with 
74 firms, of which 64 are industrial companies and 10 are shipping firms. To increase 
sample size, we supplement Kierulf’s initial 1900 list with contracts from 5 more 
industrial firms that appeared in the volume of the 1902 and 1905 Handbooks. We 
include those corporations for which we are able to find bylaws in the Brønnøysund 
registry. Our final sample therefore consists of 79 non-financial firms and corresponding 
sets of bylaws.  
For these companies we construct a system for mapping all pertinent information 
from the firms’ charters into a codeable set of categorical and indicator variables, 
                                                 
7
 The next addition of Kierulfs Handbook, printed in 1902, increased by 50% the number of listed firms 
covered, but to save space excluded these companies’ charters. 
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described in Section V.3.  For each of the 79 firms, we also collect accounting and 
financial information where available from additions of the Handbook through 1915.  
The typical Kierulf record contains rudimentary financial information, including year-end 
dividend payments and stock prices dating back three years, as well information on the 
book value of the shares, the number of shares outstanding, and year-end earnings 
figures.  Several of the records also contain balance sheet and income statement 
information.  However, these figures must be interpreted with caution, as no generally 
accepted rules of accounting existed at this time, and accounting practices appear to differ 
somewhat across firms, especially in regards to whether depreciation of physical assets 
are treated as an expense.  In calculating accounting measures of performance, we work 
hard to extract the definition most closely aligned with consistent modern definitions. All 
figures are converted to million 2009-Norwegian kroner using the Norwegian Central 
Bank’s historical CPI index. Finally, we compute the distribution of firms’ equity size in 
the year of their bylaws (typically year 1900) and consider how the characteristics of the 
bylaw provisions and key accounting ratios vary with firm size. We label that size the 
firm’s initial size. 
 
IV. Firm Capital Structure and Financial Ratios 
Tables 1-2 contain summary statistics of our sample firms, including a breakdown 
of the 79 firms by industry (Table 1), size and age (Table 2). The sample provides a fair 
spread of companies across different industries. The dominating industry is 
Manufacturing of Industrial and Consumer goods with 40 firms comprising 51 percent of 
the sample, followed by Basic Resources (14 firms) and Travel & Leisure (11 firms). The 
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Manufacturing sector encompasses a wide variety of firms, including 11 breweries 
(mostly beer), 6 ironworks and shipbuilders, 6 firms involved in maritime commercial 
transportation, 2 textile mills, a rifle-maker, 2 corn mills, 2 fabricated metal product 
manufacturer of nails and locks respectively, and otherwise manufacturers of products as 
diverse as shoes, tobacco, furniture, horse shoe nails, matches, sailcloth, and crackers. 
Basic Resources mostly comprises forestry and saw mills (5 firms), and  firms converting 
wood products to paper including companies using sulfite-based technologies for 
converting cellulose to paper pulp (9 firms). Travel & Leisure includes 5 steam ship 
companies, 2 hotels, and 3 rail transportation companies. The Telecommunication 
industry includes one manufacturer of telephone equipment, and Utilities are producers of 
hydroelectricity. Finally, the 4 firms in the Real Estate sector are akin to today’s Real 
Estate Investment Trusts, earning revenue through the rents generated from land and 
building holdings.  
Table 2 indicates that the firms in the sample were relatively young, The reported 
founding date, which we take to be the date the company was set up as a corporation, 
indicates that a third of the sample firms were incorporated within five years of 1900, and 
all but 1 firms are younger than 60 years old.  The young age suggest that many firms 
were set up or converted from the private to the corporate organizational form with the 
intension of raising public equity. By contrast, Ongena and Smith (2001) report that, as of 
1996, the average OSE firm was 53 years old. Companies were also of smaller size 
measured by today’s standards.  Measured in 2009 Norwegian kroner, the average market 
capitalization over the sample period of the turn-of-the-century firm is Kr. 44.7 million 
compared with a market capitalization of Kr 7,830 million for the average Oslo Stock 
 13 
 
Exchange (OSE) firms at the end of 2009.
8
  Only one firm in 1900 had an average market 
capitalization higher than 200 million kroner (Aktieselskabet Saugbrugsforeningen i 
Fredrikstad, with a market capitalization of Kr. 358 million).   
Table 3 contains summary statistics on the capital structure and financial key 
ratios of the 79 sample firms broken down by size as measured by paid-in equity. Total 
asset values are not available for all firms, but since debt is not a major source of finance 
for the firms in our sample, little is lost by measuring size with equity—the computed 
correlation between paid-in equity and total assets, for the firms where both figures 
available, is high at 0.92. The number of firms in the small, middle, and large size group 
is respectively 29, 23, and 27, and the size groups are defined according to the 33th and 
67
th
 percentiles of paid-in-equity. The table states accounting figures for the firms in each 
size group for which these figures are available, typically accounting figures are available 
for a little more than half of the firms in each group. The figures are averages across 
firms and years in each size group.  
 Comparing values for the median firm, Table 3 reveals that large firms are 
typically large because they hold more fixed assets and they also hold more long term 
debt. In addition, one medium-sized firm and three large-sized firms have issued public 
debt. One medium-sized and one large-sized firm issue preferred debt during the sample 
period, whereas the issue of ordinary equity is not correlated with size (two firms issue in 
each group). The debt-equity ratio (not including public debt) is higher in larger firms, 
whereas small firms appear to operate with a larger reserves-to-assets ratio. Larger and 
median firms have a slightly higher market-to-book value, whereas there is no systematic 
pattern between firm size and dividend-payout ratio.  
                                                 
8




V. Bylaw Characteristics  
V.1. A conceptual framework 
We assume the observed contracts arise as an equilibrium outcome in a situation where 
company founders attempt to raise outside financing from outside investors. Our working 
assumption is that founders will continue to have substantial influence in the running of the firm 
after the firm has gone public, either because they hold a large equity stake and/or because they 
will serve on as Directors. One can imagine that founders have superior experience and 
knowledge about the firm compared to new outside investors and therefore are able to get 
themselves elected to the Board of Directors, perhaps even without being equity blockholders.  
Founders enjoy private benefits of control the return to which is lower the more control is 
allocated to shareholders in the bylaws. The level of private benefits is private information. 
Founders exert control of firm assets and have the ability to divert profits to themselves, if they so 
choose. Outside investors understand the incentives of the founders.  They choose whether to 
participate and how to price an issue based on their share of firm profits, net of what they believe 
founders will divert.  Bylaws are legally enforceable protections that act as a commitment not to 
divert firm assets.
9
  This set of protections could include commitments to disclose pertinent 
financial information on a timely basis, guarantees that investor stakes can be sold to a third 
party, elections of ―boards‖ of delegated monitors, and clear rules for compensating, hiring and 
firing management.  Importantly, the protections can also include allocations of some of the 
firm’s decision rights to the outside shareholders.  Founders choose the extensiveness of the 
protections by weighing the benefits of a lower cost of capital against the cost of giving up the 
ability to divert funds.  Of course, as new shareholders are added to the corporation, the 
                                                 
9
 Diversion of assets could occur on a variety of dimensions, including poor management of firm assets, 
consumption of private benefits unavailable to outside investors, or outright theft of investor funds.  We 
view the set of protections to control diversion across these different dimensions. 
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ownership structure changes.  Going forward, new shareholders can influence and reshape the 
contractual protections by voting to alter the charters in a way that maximizes their ongoing stake, 
although the consideration of such changes in bylaws lies outside the scope of this paper.  
 
V.2. The format and protections in the bylaws 
The format for a corporate contract is fairly standard across all firms in our 
sample. The typical contract of bylaw provisions is composed of a series of numbered 
paragraphs that outline the protections to shareholders in the company, including rules for 
transferring ownership of shares, appointing and electing the board of directors, running 
director meetings, hiring (and firing) management, purchasing and selling assets, 
announcing and conducting the annual meeting, hiring an auditor, disclosing financial 
results, determining dividend payments, and voting at annual meetings.  The bylaws often 
also provide explicit guidance on the duties of directors and managers, and on how 
authority and decision-making should be delegated across the participants in the firm.  
Such guidance include the extent to which directors are to be involved in the daily 
management of the firm, and whether an individual with expertise in the industry be hired as a 
CEO. 
Though the contracts are homogeneous in structure, the free-contracting 
environment in Norway in 1900 allowed for ample heterogeneity in the contents of the 
contracts.  For instance, we observe a variety of different board structures (including one-
tiered Anglo-American styled boards and the two-tiered boards more common in 
continental Europe), board compensation plans (including compensation tied to firm 
accounting performance), mechanisms for controlling CEO behavior (i.e., how much the 
CEO is directly monitored), shareholder protections against dilution at new issuance 
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(whether or not a rights issue must be required), disclosure policies (ranging from no 
advanced disclosure of materials to releases 60 days in advance of the annual meeting), 
and the allocation of control rights (how important firm decisions are allocated across the 
board, supervisory board, and shareholders).   
As financial contracts, the bylaws also provide rich insight into the challenges and 
protections that were pertinent at the dawn of the 20th century.  For example, bylaws may 
include provisions assuring an adequate pool of board of directors-candidates by limiting 
shareholders’ ability to opt-out from acting as a director when nominated, require explicit 
shareholder votes on important company-level decisions that today are often delegated to 
management (for example, decisions related to large-scale purchases and to borrowing 
against fixed assets), and contain clear instructions on how the firm should be liquidated 
(including the voting majority required for liquidation and how to establish liquidating 
committees). Shareholders’ control over the liquidation decision may be the ultimate way 
to force the payment of a dividend to shareholders preventing insiders’ expropriation of 
assets. At the same time, the bylaws rarely contain explicit guidance on how to deal with 
changes in control through takeover— a central focus of present day variation in firm 
bylaws. We provide detailed descriptions of the specific aspects of the bylaw 
characteristics in Appendix B.  
 
V.3. Constructing Governance Indices 
The homogeneity in the contract format enables us to map the contents of each 
charter into a set of 140 discrete variables.  From these variables, we extract and 
summarize information in the contracts into five sub-indices akin to the good corporate 
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governance indices of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2002) and Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell (2004).  The indices are:  (1) Existence of a shareholder supervisory board (a 
dummy variable), (2) control rights vis-à-vis the Board of Directors (BoD Index), (3) 
disclosure of information to shareholders (Disclosure Index), (4) allocation of important 
decision rights to shareholders, which we term the Anti-Tunneling Index, and (5) 
provisions that capture the ease with which shareholders may bring up extraordinary 
cases in the general assembly and call extraordinary shareholder meetings (Extraordinary 
Cases Index). We further subdivide the Board of Directors index into provisions that 
require that directors also be shareholders, termed the BoD Incentives Index, and 
provisions that concern how directors report and document their activities to 
shareholders, termed the BoD Accountability Index. We also construct indices from the 
bylaws that come as close as possible to the LLSV (1998) anti-director rights index, and 
the Gompers, Ishii and Metric (2003) index. Details regarding the construction of the 
indices are provided in Appendix A.  
Perhaps one of the most unusual features of these early company contracts is the 
allocation of voting rights across shareholders. In addition to our governance indices, we 
summarize voting procedures into a variable, Dispersion of Control Rights, defined to be 
the inverse of the ratio of the maximum allowable votes a single shareholder may hold 
relative to total shares outstanding.  Dispersion of Control Rights provides a measure of 
the highest possible number of blockholders in a firm that hold the maximum number of 
votes. Firms that assign one vote per share are given the value 1 (because, in principle, 
one person may own all shares and have the maximum number of votes). 21 firms 
operate with linear voting schedules of one vote per share, the remaining 58 firms have 
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concave voting schedules in the sense that voting scales are graduated and maximum vote 
provisions apply.
10
 Firms with a larger dispersion of control rights have a larger number 
of potential shareholders with maximum voting rights, in other words, such firms have 
fundamentally limited the extent to which control may be concentrated in the company.  
The distribution of this measure is displayed in Figure 1. As can be seen, the distribution 
is highly screwed to the right. About 15 percent of the firms in our sample have a 
dispersion measure larger than 50.  We label firms in the top third of the distribution 
inclusive firms to indicate that such firms place severe restrictions on large shareholders’ 
ability to exercise control and therefore, by design, cater to smaller investors.  
We also consider the nominal size of shares as defined by the bylaws that apply in 
year 1900, displayed in Figure 2.  As can be seen, the distribution is focused on share 
sizes of 500 (22 firms) and 1000 (16 firms). At the turn of the century, the monthly salary 
for a well-paid official in government service was about 2000 Norwegian kroner. Thus, 
share prices of 1000 kr. and above are likely to have been a prohibitively costly 
investment for small retail investors. It is therefore obvious that companies with large 
share denominations, by design, cater to well-endowed investors and, mostly likely, 
investors in such firms consists of wealthy businessmen who may well be professionally 
or socially connected in other ventures or enterprises. We label the firms in the top third 
of the distribution exclusive firms, meaning that such firms tend to cater to a select 
                                                 
10
 For example, the company Akers Mekaniske Værksted, a ship builer and ironwork has in place the 
following voting rules: 1-2 shares have 1 vote, 3-5 shares have 2 votes, 6-10 shares have 3 votes, 11-15 
shares have 4 votes, 16-20 shares have 5 votes, hereafter 10 additional shares give 1 votes but no 
shareholder may have more than 10 votes. Since Akers Mek. Værksted has 1200 shares outstanding of size 
500, a shareholder would need to hold 70 shares to attain the maximum allowable number of votes, namely 
10. Thus, the company has “room‖ for 17.14 shareholders with 10 votes (=1200/70). The number 17.14 is 
then our measure of dispersion of control rights for this firm.  
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(wealthy) and exclusive group of investors. As the results section document below, the 
governance provisions in inclusive and exclusive firms tend to differ systematically.  
In Table 4 we display the governance indices and the dispersion of control rights 
by firm size. It also specifies whether, according to the bylaws, new equity issues must be 
rights issues and whether the firm must hire a CEO. With very few exceptions, all firms 
have a board of directors and most firms have a CEO. A larger fraction of large firms 
(56%) tend to have a supervisory board, compared to small (17%) and medium-sized 
firms (30%). Our coding of the bylaws reveal that firms with a Supervisory Board of 
shareholders tend to delegate decision-making that otherwise lies with shareholders at the 
annual meeting to the Supervisory Board, hence a two-tired board structure appears to be 
a remedy for collective action and coordination problems amongst shareholders. Such 
problems are likely to be more prevalent in large firms to the extent that large firms are 
associated with more shareholders. Table 4 also indicates with the bylaws specify that a 
particular person must be a director or the CEO, and whether secondary equity issues 
must be rights issues. Neither of these variables are strongly correlated with size. The 
able also includes a dummy variable for whether the firm is represented with detailed 
accounting information in the Kierulf Handbooks. Again, no strong size pattern is 
present. Perhaps more surprisingly, the variable Dispersion of Control Rights is only 
slightly increasing in firm size meaning that limitations on blockholders’ control rights 
are imposed to an almost equally strong extent in large and small firms. Hence, it is not 
firm size that drives the cross-sectional differences in the dispersion of controls rights 
depicted in Figure 1.  
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Table 5 reports the pair-wise correlation matrix between the governance indices. 
The by far largest correlation between two different indices occurs between the 
Supervisory Board Dummy and the Anti-Tunneling Index of -0.62. Interestingly, the 
negative correlation implies that in firms with a Supervisory Board, shareholders at the 
general assembly are less likely to have secured voting rights regarding the purchase and 
sale of assets, borrowing against assets, and the decision to liquidate the firm. This 
suggests that an important role of the Supervisory Board is moving the monitoring of the 
Board of Directors from the General Assembly to the Board. We also observe that firms 
that have a Supervisory Board in place tend to make it easier for shareholders to call 
extraordinary meetings and bring up extraordinary cases at the annual meeting, and they 
also tend to impose stricter disclosure requirements. These three correlations are mutually 
consistent in the sense that they capture different dimensions along with firms may 
prevent the expropriation of minority shareholders. We also observe that the Board of 
Directors Index is very highly correlated with its subindex BoD Accountability. The 
remaining correlates are relatively small, although we note that the Anti-Tunneling Index 
and the Extraordinary Cases  Index is negatively correlated, perhaps indicating some 
degree of substitution. As regards the indices’ correlation with the LLSV and GIM 
indices, no clear pattern emerges except a, surprising, negative correlation with our Anti-
Tunneling Index. We believe the lack of relationship between ours and the modern-day 
LLSV and GIM indices may be caused by the fact that the latter are based on to a time 
period where corporate laws secure various basic rights of investors, whereas the 
investors in our sample have no such rights to rely on.  
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We also make an attempt to assess the firms’ underlying growth opportunities, 
which we estimate by industry. From the Norwegian Statistical Bureau Historical 
Yearbooks, we are able to find data on the number of workers employed in the most 
important types of factories starting in 1889 which we allocate into industries. 
Unfortunately, workers numbers are not available for non-industrial factories. To 
estimate growth opportunities in the telecommunications sector, we use data on the 
number of telephone apparatus in the city of Oslo (capital of Norway). This information 
is available from various yearbooks of the publication ―Account of Oslo Town’s Trade, 
Industry, and Shipping‖ (Beretning om Christiania Bys Handel, Industri og Skibsfart). 
The same publication also contains information about the annually issued number of 
permissions to open a retail trade business (borgerskabsbreve på handel), and the annual 
number of building permits granted. The number of trade permits is used to estimate 
growth opportunities for firms in the retail consumer services industry, the number of 
building permits for firms in the real estate sector. For each industry we compute the 
average annual growth rates over the period 1900 – 1910 (the longest possible period 
available for all industries).  The estimated growth rates are displayed in Table 6. We 
consider the characteristics of the bylaws of firms in the fastest growing industries in the 
empirical section of the paper below.  
 
VI. Empirical Results 
VI.1. Bylaw Characteristics: Tests of Differences in Means  
We start investigating the characteristics of the bylaw provisions for inclusive and 
exclusive firms respectively. Table 7 shows the distribution of inclusive and exclusive 
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firms across industries. Compared to the overall distribution of firms, inclusive firms are 
overrepresented in consumer service industries and underrepresented in basic resources 
industries. For exclusive firms the pattern is opposite. There is an equal number of each 
type of firm in the industrial goods and services sector.  
We then split the sample in three groups by the Dispersion of Control Rights 




 percentile. We test the difference in mean value of 
key bylaw provisions between the firms in the top third of the distribution, the inclusive 
firms, and the firms in the bottom third of the distribution. The results are displayed in 
Table 8, columns 2-4. Inclusive firms’ share sizes are significantly smaller and their 
bylaws less often specify that shares must be name shares. These provisions appear 
naturally related to the dispersed control structure of the firms which invite many and 
small shareholders. The internal governance structure of inclusive firms is interesting: 
They have a shareholder supervisory board more frequently and the higher value of the 
BoD Incentives Index implies that it is more often a requirement that directors be 
shareholders in the firm and that shareholders must stand ready to be elected as directors 
unless they have served as directors previously. Both characteristics are consistent with 
overcoming collective action and free-rider problems among a dispersed population of 
shareholders. Shareholders tend not to vote on major decisions in the firm such as asset 
purchase/sale, liquidation, and borrowing as given by the Anti-Tunneling Index, this may 
reflect that the dispersed nature of control rights makes it inefficient to delegate such 
decisions to the general assembly or the supervisory board when it exists. On the other 
hand, the ease with which shareholders may bring up extraordinary cases in shareholder 
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meetings is significantly higher in inclusive firms as given by the Extraordinary Cases 
Index.  
Next, we split the sample into three groups by initial share size and test for 
differences in means between the top third of the firms with the largest share sizes and 
the bottom third. The top third group of firms is the exclusive firms and comprises the 
firms with shares of sizes 1000 kr.and above. The bottom third is defined as firms with 
share sizes below 500 kr.
11
  The test of differences in means are shown in Table 8, 
columns 5-7. Not surprisingly, exclusive firms have a lower dispersion of control rights. 
They also tend to be larger in size, which may reflect their concentration in the basic 
resources industry (Table 7). They are less often set up with a shareholder representative 
board, despite the fact that the firms are larger, and the bylaws more often specify that the 
shares be name shares. Both of these observations are consistent with a control structure 
comprised of wealthier, more sophisticated shareholders, who likely belong to certain 
families or the business communities in the respective cities of the firms. In such closely-
held firms, it is imperative to know exactly who the shareholders are. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the requirement that new share issues be offered to existing shareholders 
(rights issues) is not significantly larger. Shareholders in exclusive firms tend to monitor 
directors by imposing explicit requirements that directors report to the shareholders or the 
supervisory board when it exists. On the other hand, it is not more typical to require that 
directors be shareholders themselves, which may suggest that boards tend to be more 
―professional‖ in the sense, hired from outside the firm. Shareholders tend to have more 
control over major business decisions such as asset sales (Anti-Tunneling Index), but the 
                                                 
11
 Notice that, due to the large concentration of shares at sizes 500 and 1000, it is not possible to create 
three equal-sized groups of firms.  
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threshold for bringing extraordinary cases to the shareholder meetings are higher 
(Extraordinary Cases Index). Notice that liquidation is the ultimate way to force a 
dividend or prevent insiders from expropriating wealth from shareholders.  Together, 
these provisions confirm our hypothesis that these firms cater to more sophisticated 
shareholders.  
Table 9 displays the results performing a similar exercise, but splitting the sample 
of firms according to firm size and growth opportunities as given by the estimated 
industry growth rates shown in Table 6. Larger firms tend to have a higher ratio of fixed 
to total assets, they more often have a supervisory board and their bylaws tend to stipulate 
the disclosure of company information to shareholders. Considering the top third of firms 
in the fastest growing industries, these firms distinguish themselves by issuing more 
shares in seasoned issues and they also provide more information to shareholders. As we 
also document below, this is really the defining characteristic of firms that need to raise 
capital—such firms disclose significantly more information than do firms that do not 
raise additional capital. This finding is strongly in line with our hypothesis that firms 
write bylaws taking into account the specific needs of the firm; bylaws are not 
determined exogenously.  
 
 VI.2. Governance and Dividend-Payout Policy 
 We then consider the dividend-payment decision and its association to firms’ 
bylaw provisions. In a situation of considerable asymmetric information, absent of 
regulations regarding accounting and disclosure, the payment of dividends is a way to 
build reputation by signaling to investors that insiders are not expropriating the firm. To 
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explore this hypothesis, we regress firms’ propensity to pay dividends out of their annual 
surplus on our key governance indices. We are able to construct dividend-payout ratios 
for 571 firm-years, out of a total of 1127 firm-year observations. Included in the 
regressions are three basic control variables: Initial Firm Age, which is the firm’s age at 
the time it enters the sample, Initial Equity, which is equity in the year of the bylaws 
(typically 1900), and Market-to-Nominal Share Value which is the (time-varying) market 
value of the firm’s ordinary equity divided by its nominal (par) value.12  We do not have 
stock price information for all years which brings the sample down to 532 firm-year 
observations. All variables are measured ultimo-year.  
Table 10 gives the results of GLS regressions of dividend-payout ratio on 
governance indices and control variables. Model M1 shows results from a base case 
regressions where no governance indices are included. Market-to-Nominal is significant 
with a positive sign, i.e. dividend ratios tend to be higher when firms’ equity is valued 
higher. This result is very reassuring given that there is likely to be considerably noise in 
historical data. Also notice that this coefficient is identified by both cross-sectional and 
time variation, whereas the other regressors are constant over time. Older firms tend to 
pay higher dividend, whereas the coefficient on firm size is not significant at 
conventional levels. At quick glance at the coefficient on Initial Firm Size in the other 
model specifications reveal that it, in contrast to Firm Age and Market-to-Nominal is 
somewhat non-robust.  
In models M2-M6, we include one governance index at a time. All indices appear 
with a negative sign, and all are significant, except the Supervisory Board Dummy. The 
                                                 
12
 We are not able to construct ‖proper‖ market-to-book values because we do not have frequent 
information about firm’s retained earnings, hence we prefer to work with a pseudo market to book 
meausure in order retain as many observations as possible in the sample.  
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negative signs imply that bylaw provisions that grant better controls to shareholders are 
associated with lower dividend ratios, which is suggestive of a substitution between 
dividends and investor protections. Our interpretation of this result is that lower control 
rights require the payment of higher dividends, That is, the dividend payments serve as a 
substitute to a contractual commitment not to steal cash in the firm. When we include all 
governance indices into the regression at the same time, cf. M7, the Extraordinary Cases 
Index and the Board of Directors Index continue to be significant.  
In Tables 11 and 12 we re-run the regressions with a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firm belongs to the group of exclusive, respectively, inclusive firms. We are 
interested in seeing whether the negative association between investor protection and 
dividend payments is moderated by firm type. For the exclusive firms, the estimated 
interaction term in Table 11 is negative for all governance indices and significant at 
conventional levels for the Disclosure, Anti-Tunneling, and Extraordinary Cases Indices. 
The negative sign implies that a one unit increase in investor protections enable firms to 
lower dividends even more. Comparing to the results in Table 12, where we use a dummy 
for inclusive firms, it is clear that there is no similar effect for this group of firms. Thus, 
we conclude that investor protections appear to be more potent in exclusive firms in the 
sense that it ―buys‖ more in terms to dividend-reductions. The reason for this result may 
be that the value of a given bylaw is worth more to sophisticated shareholders because 
they are better able to enforce it, or it may be that sophisticated shareholders are better 
able to recognize that retention of surplus may benefit the firm, and hence shareholder 




VI.3. Governance and Equity Issues 
Finally, we run regressions of firms’ propensity to issue equity in seasoned 
offerings on the governance indices. We observe 50 issues of ordinary equity during the 
sample but in 9 of these cases, i.e. almost 20 percent, the value of the firm’s stock price is 
missing in the issue year. We therefore construct a pseudo-panel with two time periods, 
where observations are averaged over time within each period. We split observations 
before and after 1905, such that the first period comprises the years 1886-1904, and the 
second period the years 1905-1910. We have less frequent information available prior to 
1905 therefore the first period is longer. All variables are hereafter replaced by their 
average values within each time period. Table 13 shows the results of these regressions. 
In models M1-M7 we report results from a pooled OLS regression. In model M8 we run 
instead a Weighted Least Squares (GLS) regression where observations are weighted 
with the inverse of estimated industry-wide standard errors. These are estimated in a 
separate first step regression. As can be seen, the results do not differ markedly between 
the two models. In model M1, we consider first the estimated coefficients on the control 
variables: First Age and size (Initial Equity) have no systematic effect on firms’ 
propensity to issue equity (although First Age has a negative sign, it is not close to being 
statistically significant). Market-to-Nominal share value is significant and has a positive 
sign, that is, firms tend to issue equity when their share price is high which is exactly as 
we would expect.  
Considering next the estimated coefficients on the governance indices, the 
Disclosure and the Extraordinary Cases Indices both have a positive sign and are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Hence, shareholders in firms that issue 
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equity are more likely to write strong disclosure requirements into their bylaws. They are 
also more likely to grant shareholders easy access to raise extraordinary issues (whether 
in the ordinary assembly or in an extraordinary meeting). These results make intuitive 
sense: In order to attract capital from outside investors, firms will need to reduce the 
degree of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. The results are 
especially interesting in the light of the Corporate Law that was eventually introduced in 




We study corporate governance in turn-of-the century firm-level bylaws from 
Norway in a free contracting environment before the first Norwegian corporate law. The 
firms in our sample are publicly traded companies that are traded over-the-counter 
amongst dealers on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We observe considerable heterogeneity in 
the investor protections stipulated in the contracts with regards to board structure, 
director responsibilities and remuneration, disclosure of company information to 
shareholders and the general public, shareholder voting rights and control over major 
company decisions such as dividend policy, liquidation, and asset sales and purchases, 
amongst others.  We conclude that firms endogenously choose their bylaws and that 
effective governance systems and dispersed ownership structures may develop 
independently of statutory corporate law. Hence, the one-rule-fits-all investor protections 
of statutory law may impose considerable costs on firms and their shareholders.  
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 We further investigate the relationship between firms’ dividend policy and 
bylaw protections. Our results suggest that firms with weaker protections tend to pay 
higher dividends, that is, investor protection and dividends are substitutes. This result 
suggests that high dividends work as a signal that insiders will not expropriate minority 
shareholders.  As such dividend policy may be a substitute for corporate law and help 
separate ownership from control by fostering dispersed control structures in firms with 
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Definition of Governance Indices 
 
 
Index 1: Disclosure 
Adds a one for each of the following conditions contained in the bylaws: 
1. The minimum time (days) ahead of annual meeting date that 
announcement of the meeting to shareholders occur. The variable 
is scaled relative to the maximum amount of time observed in the 
data, such that for firms which give notice of maximum length 
the condition adds one, whereas for firms which give notice of 
shorter time, the condition adds a value strictly less than one. 
2. Requirement that annual meeting be held no later than a fixed 
period of time following end of fiscal year. 
3. The minimum time ahead of annual meeting (days) that annual 
financial statements and information is made available to 
shareholders prior to annual meeting. The variable is scaled 
relative to the maximum amount of time observed in the data, 
data, such that for firms which make the information available 
with the maximum time ahead of the meeting the condition adds 
one, whereas for firms which make the information available a 
shorter time in advance of the meeting, the condition adds a 
value strictly less than one. 
4. Existence of specific mechanism for making annual financial 
statements available to shareholders prior to annual meeting 
(e.g., via direct mail, newspaper announcement, or open to 
inspection at company headquarters).  
5. Requirement that company appoints a treasurer (kasserer). 
6. Requirement that auditor be appointed and approved by the 
General Assembly at the annual meeting, by the Board of 
Directors, or the Supervisory Board. 
 
Index 2: Board of Directors (BoD)  
Adds a one for each of the following conditions contained in the bylaws: 
1. Requirement that BoD members be shareholders of the company. 
2. Requirement that shareholders elected to the BoD must serve on the 
Board (cannot avoid service as Director unless the shareholder has 
previously served as director or without other good reason). 
3. Requirement that bylaws contain no mention of a specific person 
who must always be a member of the BoD. 
4. Requirement that the BoD records minutes of their meetings. 
5. Requirement that the BoD report their activities at least once at year 
(possibly at the general assembly) to shareholders if a Supervisory 
Board does not exist, or to the Supervisory Board if it exists.  
 33 
 
6. Requirement that Directors’ salary is defined in charter or that salary 
requires the approval of shareholders at the General Assembly or the 
Supervisory Board (when it exists). 
                 
 
Subindex 2a: Board of Directors (BoD) incentives 
Adds a one for each of the following conditions contained in the bylaws: 
1. Requirement that BoD members be shareholders of the company. 
2. Requirement that shareholders elected to the BoD must serve on the 
Board (cannot avoid service as Director unless the shareholder has 
previously served as director or without other good reason). 
3. Requirement that bylaws contain no mention of a specific person 
who must always be a member of the BoD. 
 
Subindex 2b: Board of Directors (BoD) accountability 
Adds a one for each of the following conditions contained in the bylaws: 
1. Requirement that the BoD records minutes of their meetings. 
2. Requirement that the BoD report their activities at least once at year 
(possibly at the general assembly) to shareholders if a Supervisory 
Board does not exist, or to the Supervisory Board if it exists.  
3. Requirement that Directors’ salary is defined in charter or that salary 
requires the approval of shareholders at the General Assembly or the 
Supervisory Board (when it exists). 
 
Index 3: Supervisory Board Dummy 
Adds a one for each of the following conditions contained in the bylaws: 
1. A Supervisory Board elected among the shareholders of the 
company exists.  
 
 
Index 4: Anti-tunneling 
Adds a one for each of the following conditions contained in the bylaws: 
1. Requirement that large asset purchases must be approved by General 
Assembly if a Supervisory Board does not exist, or by the 
Supervisory Board if it does exist.  
2. Requirement that new borrowing or debt issuances must be approved 
by General Assembly if a Supervisory board does not exist, or by the 
Supervisory Board if it does exist. 
3. Requirement that liquidation or sales of substantial company assets 
must be approved by the General Assembly if a Supervisory Board 
does not exist, or by the Supervisory Board if it does exist.  
                 
 
Index 5: Extraordinary Cases Index 
Adds a one for each of the following conditions contained in the bylaws: 
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1. Bylaws contain explicit mention that shareholders have the right to 
bring up extraordinary issues in the annual meeting. 
2. It requires no more than one shareholder to bring up extraordinary 
issues in annual meeting. 
3. The minimum time (days) ahead of annual meeting date that issues 
to be treated at the annual meeting must be filed. The variable is 
scaled relative to the maximum amount of time observed in the data, 
such that firms that provide less time are registered with a value 
strictly less than one. 
4. Topics treated at annual meeting are limited to those previously 
announced.  
5. Shareholders can call an extraordinary meeting with 10% or less of 
outstanding shares or with a coalition of 5 shareholders or fewer. 
 




Details of the Bylaw Characteristics 
 
 
This appendix provides a detailed overview of investor protections written into the 
Norwegian bylaws of 1900. Below, we group the protections into five categories relevant 
to corporate governance: (1) Board and CEO structure, (2) transferability and issuance of 
shares, (3) disclosure policy, (4) the allocation of decision rights, and (5) shareholder 
voting rules, in particular, how shareholders may exercise their decision rights.  
 
B.1 Board and CEO structure 
Every charter contract includes a description of a group (or groups) of individuals elected 
by shareholders to oversee and manage the company’s business.  The description includes 
information on who is eligible to sit on a board, how board members are elected or appointed, the 
length of the term, and how alternates are selected.  The description may also contain information 
on the board members’ duties and compensation. 
Panels A and B of Table B-1 summarize some of the pertinent information on board 
structure contained in the charters.  The first thing to note is that two basic board structures are 
observed in the contracts:  a one-tiered managing board of directors (direktion), much like you 
see in modern U.S. and U.K. companies, and a two-tiered board with a supervisory board 
(repræsentantskab) sitting atop a managing board, as is common in continental European 
countries.  Panel B indicates that 35% of the sample contracts specify the two-tiered structure; the 
rest specify only the one-tier managing board.   
The turn-of-the century managing board was typically small, with three directors on the 
median-sized board.  In 85% of the contracts, directors are required to be shareholders; in 18% of 
the contracts, they must also be residents of the area in which the company is located.  The 
directors serve a median three-year term and can be reappointed at the end of their term.  Indeed, 
shareholders are typically required to serve as board members if elected, and can only excuse 
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themselves from the responsibility for a time-period equal to their tenure as a director.  The 
boards in our sample board terms are typically staggered, with a given fraction – usually 1/4 or 
1/3 – of the terms coming due each year (not shown in table).  Rather than a mechanism to defend 
against takeovers, the board terms were likely staggered to aid in transitioning new members onto 
the board.  Contracts often contain information about director compensation.  Though the 
directors are themselves shareholders, 38% of the contracts also specify that directors will receive 
pay tied to the performance of the firm.  Typically, the measure of performance is accounting 
earnings. 
Another interesting feature of the turn-of-the-century managing board was its 
involvement in the day-to-day business of the company.  The median contract requires managing 
boards to meet at least twice a month (not shown in table), and many contracts require weekly 
meetings. Moreover, 87% of the contracts specify directly that managing directors must 
participate in some type of daily activity within the firm. These duties include receiving, and 
signing for, daily deliveries and overseeing the activities of the CEO.  In 61% of the contracts, 




Where they are included, supervisory boards appear primarily to take on the 
responsibility of hiring auditors for the firm and managing the disclosure of the firm’s financial 
statements.  When a Supervisory Board exists, it takes over from the shareholders the 
responsibility of appointing managing board directors at the annual meeting.   However, in 
contracts that include a supervisory board, shareholders almost always (96% of the time) elect the 
supervisory board members.  Thus, unlike the European supervisory boards of today, there were 
no laws in 1900 that required stakeholders other than shareholders to take part in the board-
selection process.  As Panel B of Table B-1 indicates, the supervisory boards are typically much 
larger than the managing boards (with a median of 12 members) and supervisory board members 
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serve shorter terms (median = 2 years) than managing board directors.  Unlike managing board 
directors, supervisory board members are not contracted to receive pay for performance. 
Though managing board directors appear to play an important role in the day-to-day 
running of the sample firms, as shown in Panel C of Table 2, most (87%) of the contracts also 
specify that an individual with expertise in the industry be hired as a CEO (the term for this 
position varies across contracts and industries: forretningsfører, chef, disponent, bestyrer, 
administrativ direktør).  Thus, the contracts at the time recognized the efficiencies gained from 
having some separation of ownership from control.  Indeed, unlike the managing board directors, 
the CEO typically did not have to be a shareholder (required in only 6% of cases) and was 
specifically hired as an expert to run the business.  Daily decision making was often (78% of the 
time) delegated to the CEO, and the CEO could be endowed with the legal responsibility for 
contracting with 3
rd
 parties (in 29% of the cases).  Moreover, the CEO could participate and vote 
as a managing board director in 41% of the cases.  But 69% of the contracts still make explicit 
that the CEO must take instructions from the managing board.  And among firms allowing the 
CEO a position on the managing board, only 18% allow the CEO to be chairman.   
 The last panel of Table B-1 (Panel D) reports on an event that is relatively uncommon 
across the contracts, but nonetheless interesting. Six of the contracts (8%) specify a named 
individual, or set of individuals, that must take part in management or supervision of the firm 
until their death or some other condition is met.  Thus, for example, in the charter for Krag-
Jørgensens Geværkompagni (a well-known riflemaker at the time), paragraph 6 states, 
The board of directors shall be composed of 4 directors elected at the annual meeting, 
together with Captain O. Krag, or the shareholder that he designates by proxy to 
participate on the board.  
 
Krag was co-founder of the company. The paragraph goes on to say that in the event of Krag’s 
death, a fifth member of the board can be selected at the annual meetings.  Panel D indicates that 
the majority of these contractual proscriptions were to allow founding family members a seat on 
the managing or supervisory boards of the companies.  However, in one case – Aktieselskapet 
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Franklin, Baker, & Co – the British founder James Franklin stipulates in the contract that he is 




B.2 Transferability and issuance of shares  
Recognizing that an appealing property of corporate equity ownership is that shares can 
be sold, all charters provide some information on the transferability of ownership.
13
  Kraakman, et 
al. (2004) argue that one of the essential features that distinguish stock shares in corporations 
from ownership in other organizational forms is the ability to liquefy your ownership position.  
As shown in Panel A of Table B-2, nearly every company required shares be registered in the 
name of the owner and that a shareholder list be maintained at company headquarters.  This 
practice stood in contrast to the common use of bearer shares in many continental European 
countries during this time period (Kuhn, 1912 and Villars-Dahl, 1984).  Roughly one-third of 
companies imposed a restriction that required a director’s approval—or at least notification—
before shares could be sold.   
 As can also be seen in Panel A of Table B-2, about half of the contracts provide some 
information on how new equity issuances will occur.  This contractual feature is important 
because it sets the protections that existing shareholders have against future dilution of their 
stake.  Only 19% of the contracts—or about 40% of the contracts that discuss share issuances—
require a rights offering.  This low percentage may simply reflect the fact that owners desired the 
right to seek quick financing through a 3
rd
-party source without working through a rights offering, 
or it may indicate that many companies viewed future share issuances to be rare enough that the 
type of offering need not be specified. 
 
B.3 Disclosure policies  
                                                 
13
 Of course, this finding is endogenous to the fact that our sample is limited to the most actively traded 
publicly listed companies.   
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As discussed above, both Norway and Denmark have a rich history of requiring 
businesses to disclose pertinent company information, primarily for the protection of 3
rd
-party 
claimants, such as creditors.  Moreover, the business registration laws of 1874 and 1890 required 
companies to make detailed disclosures at the time of registration, and as part those disclosures, 
identify a plan for future periodic disclosures.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the Norwegian 
contracts we observe contain details about disclosure. 
Nonetheless, as is apparent from Panel B of Table B-2, wide variation existed across the 
contracts in how disclosures occurred.   First, only about 2/3 of the contracts committed to 
disclose the company’s financial statements to shareholders prior to the annual meeting.  The 
remaining 1/3 required that shareholders attend the annual meeting, digest firm performance, and 
vote based on that performance, at the meeting. Among those companies making advanced 
disclosures, contracts commonly specified that the financials would be made available two weeks 
in advance of the meeting at the company’s headquarters.  Some contracts provided more lead 
time in advance of the meeting (with a maximum of 60 days); one contract promised to mail the 
financial statements to each shareholder, while another committed to publish the results in local 
newspapers.  70% of the contracts committed to notify shareholders of an upcoming annual 
meeting in local and national newspapers.  The median contract committed to advertising the 
meeting in 2 newspapers, with one often being a national circular or Oslo newspaper.  In addition 
to newspaper announcements, some companies committed to mailing an announcement to each 
shareholder (not shown in table). 
 
 
B.4 Allocation of decision rights 
 An important component of the charter contracts is the specification of what firm 
decision rights remain in the hands of shareholders and what is delegated to the boards.  Panel A 
of Table B-3 details these allocations across a variety of decisions.  In addition to following 
whether decision rights are allocated across the managing and supervisory boards or shareholders, 
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the panel includes the category, ―Fixed in contract‖ because some of the decision rights are pre-
specified as part of the charter. 
 Panel A of Table B-3 indicates that the hiring of the CEO and the determination of is 
most often delegated to the managing board, or to a lesser extent, the supervisory board, although 
in 5% of contracts a shareholder vote is required.  Deciding the salaries of the managing board 
directors is roughly split evenly across the supervisory board, shareholders, and fixed by contract.  
Auditors are appointed by supervisory boards when supervisory boards are part of the company, 
otherwise they are approved by shareholders. 
 Perhaps most interesting is the observed variation in the allocation of rights associated 
with large investment and financing decisions.  Most of the contracts provide specific guidance as 
to who approves the purchase and sale of large assets, including liquidating or selling the entire 
firm, borrowing that involves encumbering assets as collateral, payment of dividends, and as 
mentioned earlier, the issuance of new shares.  A little over half of the firms keep the decision to 
acquire or sell fixed assets in the hands of the shareholders, while about 1/3 delegates the decision 
to the managing and supervisory boards.  The benefit of allocating such decisions to shareholders 
is that it protects them against wasteful management spending.  The cost of allocating the 
decisions arise from shareholder coordination problems, if shareholders are unable to agree, or it 
is costly to postpone a decision until all shareholders can vote, valuable investment opportunities 
may be wasted.   
Only in 36% of the cases do shareholders vote directly on how dividends will be paid out 
each year.  The supervisory board, or a combination of the supervisory and managing board, often 
makes the decision (34% of the cases).  But in 28% of the contracts, the contract provides a direct 
formula for how dividends are to be paid.  A typical formula for payouts starts by allocating a 
fixed percentage of the book value of the shares as dividends to shareholders, then sets aside a 
fixed amount of any remaining earnings to a reserve account and directors’ pay, and then leaves 
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any remaining amount to be paid out according to the discretion of the shareholders.  Although 
shareholders have some discretion in these cases, the level of discretion is low.
14
  
As many as 87% of the contracts assure that shareholders vote directly on the liquidation 
decision.  The liquidation clause in these contracts likely existed for a number of reasons.   First, 
by requiring a shareholder vote – typically with supermajority voting requirements (see below) – 
the clause prevented insiders or management from selling the company out from under existing 
shareholders (for example, at an unreasonably low price).  Second, it provided shareholders with 
the option to sell the company as a going-concern to a potential acquirer.  Third, it provided a 
roadmap resolving sales of the firm in case of financial distress.  Finally, the clause provided a 
way for shareholders to limit the time management had to run the business before ―cashing out.‖ 
 It is also interesting to notice the fraction of the contracts that are silent on the individual 
decisions. Most contracts contain stipulations regarding dividend policy, the liquidity decision 
and the appointment of auditors. However, a surprisingly large fraction, respectively 19% and 
32%, are silent on such important decisions as sales/purchases of major assets and borrowing 
against the assets of the firm. This underscores our point that insider expropriation may have been 
a main mechanism for insiders to extract surplus from the firm.  
 
B.5 Shareholder exercise of decision rights 
 Shareholders exercise their control over company management through the votes that 
they cast, on behalf of board candidates and on decisions that contractually required a shareholder 
vote.  In turn-of-the-century contracts, the relative power of minority shareholders to influence 
                                                 
14
 The contracted dividend policy at Aktieselskabet Kværner Brug (a precursor to one part of today’s Aker 
Kværner concern) is a good example: 
Of the profits, there can be returned, after all operating and other expenses are covered together 
with all necessary write-downs, first to preferred shareholders a dividend up to 6 percent of the 
book value of the preferred shares. Thereafter, an amount up to 5 percent of the book value of 
common shares can be paid to common shareholders; of any remainder must one-quarter be set 




the outcome of a vote depended on the quorums and majorities required to approve or reject a 
certain decision. High meeting quorums, requiring the presence of a relatively large number of 
shareholders before a vote could be taken, and supermajority voting provisions weakened the 
ability for large blockholders to influence the outcome of a decision.   
The typical company in our sample required no meeting quorum and a simple 51% 
majority when voting on standard items at an annual meeting, including the election of the board, 
board compensation, dividend payout, and acceptance of the current year’s audited financial 
statements.  For these decisions, and under the assumption that shareholders received one vote per 
share, a 51% shareholder or group of shareholders could exert significant influence over the 
governance of the firm.
15
 Quorum and supermajority requirements came into play in more 
important decisions.  
As can be seen in Panel B of Table B-3, quorum rules and supermajority requirements 
were associated with votes to approve acquisitions and sales of fixed assets, new equity issuances, 
liquidation of the firm, and changes to the charter laws themselves.  As discussed above and 
shown in Panel of A of Table B-3, only slightly more than half of all contracts allow shareholders 
to participate in decisions related to acquisitions, asset sales, and new equity issuances.  Among 
the firms that do allow a shareholder vote, few require a meeting quorum and the median firm 
requires only a simple majority for approval.  Yet a handful of contracts do require quorum votes 
and or supermajority provisions before these events can be carried out.  
Quorum rules and supermajority provisions are much more common in decisions to 
liquidate the firm and change the laws in the charter.  Among the 63 firms that specify a quorum 
for liquidations, the median firm required 50% of the outstanding voting capital be represented at 
the meeting, and among the 71 firms specifying that shareholders must vote before a liquidation 
can occur, the median voting majority required to approve a liquidation was 2/3.   Votes on 
                                                 
15
 However, as discussed below, one-share, one-vote provisions were relatively rare. 
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changes in charter laws follow a similar patter, though fewer firms (50) require a quorum for the 
change-in-law vote.   
That liquidations and changes to the charter were the most common decisions requiring a 
supermajority is perhaps not surprising since insiders could most easily steal or freeze out 
minority investors either by selling the firm – diverting all of its assets – at a value below the 
market value, or by changes the laws to directly weaken the decision rights of minority 
shareholders.  Indeed, it is interesting to observe that some firms provided little or no protection 
against liquidations and charter changes.  Two contracts (for Christiania Aktie-Ølbryggeri and 
Fredrikshalds Kanalselskab) make no mention of whether shareholders had a direct say 
liquidation decisions at all, and 14.4% of the sample (not shown in table) required only simple 
majorities to further a liquidation.    
In addition to voting to approve or reject proposals put forth by management at annual 
meetings, shareholders in many of our sample firms could also put up their own proposals for a 
vote.  They accomplish this in two ways:  by lobbying for a proposal to be considered at the 
annual meeting, and by calling for extraordinary meetings.   
Table B-4 summarizes the frequency of such protections across our contracts.  Less than 
half (36, 46%) of our contracts explicitly allow shareholders to put a proposal on the agenda at 
the time of the annual meeting.   But among the firms that do, the number of shareholders 
required to get the proposal on the agenda is small, the median requirement is one shareholder, 
and the mean is less than three.  Allowing shareholders to call an extraordinary meeting is more 
common across the contracts, 59 (75%) provide direct guidance on how to do so.  The median 
requirement among these contracts is that shareholders representing at least 25% of the 
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Distribution of Sample Firms by Industry
Number Percent
Basic Resources 14 17.7
Industrials
Construction & Materials 2 2.5
Industrial Goods & Services 15 19.0
Consumer Goods
Food & Beverage 15 19.0




Travel & Leisure 11 13.9
Telecommunications 3 3.8
Utilities 2 2.5
Real Estate 4 5.1
Total 79 99.9
Note: The table shows the distribution of firms according to industry sectors. Industry sectors are classified
according to the FTSE/DJI Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).
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Table 2:















> 200 2 2.5
Total 79 100.1
Note: Firms’ average market value of equity is measured in million 2008-Norwegian kroner and averaged
for all years the firm is in the sample prior to 1911. Age is the age of the firm in year 1900.
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Table 3:
Capital Structure Characteristics and Financial Ratios: 1895–1910
Small Firms Middle Firms Large Firms
Obs. Mean Median Min. Max. Obs. Mean Median Min. Max. Obs. Mean Median Min. Max.
Age 29 10.7 4 1 43 23 17.9 10 1 82 27 15.5 5 1 44
Common Equity 29 15.6 12.9 0.92 29.6 23 39.5 39.6 29.7 50.8 27 92.0 68.7 51.4 303.3
Paid-in Equity 29 15.1 12.9 0.92 29.6 23 39.2 39.6 27.2 50.8 27 89.3 68.7 51.4 250.8
Total Assets 16 28.8 28.7 1.92 62.4 15 86.1 70.4 31.4 228.8 17 184.5 158.1 62.2 494.8
Total Debt 16 9.48 4.32 0.07 46.2 15 41.6 25.1 5.51 188.1 17 63.0 56.5 0.96 138.8
Accumulated Reserves 22 3.59 2.81 -2.08 12.8 15 7.98 4.60 24.0 0.41 21 15.4 11.9 -7.78 55.8
Long-Term Debt 14 9.32 4.54 0 45.8 14 29.1 22.3 0 96.0 19 30.4 26.8 0 94.2
Fixed Assets 16 18.3 16.3 1.77 58.5 15 62.0 51.0 18.3 166.4 19 129.6 101.3 34.3 303.7
Market Capitalization 29 13.1 11.3 0.59 38.4 23 35.9 35.8 15.2 59.7 27 85.9 67.7 0.69 358.3
No. Ord. Equity Issues 29 0.10 0 0 2 23 0.43 0 0 2 27 0.30 0 0 2
No. Pref. Equity Issues 29 – – – – 23 0.26 0 0 1 27 0.07 0 0 1
No. Public Debt Issues 29 – – – – 23 0.13 0 0 1 27 0.30 0 0 3
Debt-Equity Ratio 16 0.81 0.29 0.01 5.99 15 1.30 0.82 0.13 5.44 17 0.64 0.60 0.02 1.17
Equity Ratio 16 0.80 0.78 0.30 1.76 13 0.64 0.68 0.18 0.89 17 0.69 0.67 0.47 0.98
Reserve Ratio 16 0.20 0.13 0.02 0.89 13 0.11 0.08 0 0.33 17 0.09 0.09 -0.06 0.31
Fixed Asset Ratio 7 0.62 0.62 0.40 0.96 6 0.84 0.89 0.53 0.98 9 0.75 0.83 0.49 0.94
Market-to-Nom 29 0.90 0.87 0.14 2.11 23 0.96 1.00 0.49 1.41 27 0.97 0.93 0.04 2.01
Ord. Equity Issue Ratio 29 0.00 0 0 0.05 23 0.01 0 0 0.08 27 0.01 0 0 0.04
Pref. Equity Issue Ratio 16 – – – – 23 0.01 0 0 0.09 27 0.00 0 0 0.04
Dividend-Payout Ratio 20 0.48 0.51 -0.03 1.34 15 0.37 0.38 0 0.90 23 0.58 0.62 0 1.11
Dividend-Equity Ratio 29 0.07 0.05 0 0.80 23 0.05 0.05 0 0.11 26 0.05 0.05 0 0.10
Note: The table shows the value of key accounting variable as well as key financial ratios. All values are in million 2009-Norwegian
kroner. The sample of firm is split into groups according to the 33 and 67 percentiles of paid-in equity. The correlation between total
assets and paid-in equity is 0.94. Sample period: 1985–1910. Age is firm age the first year it enters the sample. Common equity
includes both committed and nonissued equity. Paid-in equity is the amount of ordinary and preferred equity that has been paid in
by shareholders. Total assets is the sum of the firm’s assets. Total debt is the sum of long-term and short-term debt. Accumulated
reserves is previous years’ earnings that has been retained in the firm. Long-term debt is debt that is collateralized debt. Fixed asset
is the stated book value of the firms’ fixed assets (typically not depreciated). Market capitalization is the ultimo-year market value of
paid-in equity. No. ord. equity issues indicates the percentage of sample years in which the average firm issues ordinary equity. No.
pref. equity issues indicates the percentage of sample years in which the average firm issues preferred equity. No. public debt issues
indicates the percentage of sample years in which the average firm issues public debt (obligationer). Debt-equity ratio is the ratio of
total debt to paid-in equity. Equity ratio is the ratio of paidin-equity to total assets. Reserve ratio is the ratio of accumulated reserves
to total assets. Fixed asset ratio is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Market-to-Nom is the stock price divided by its nominal
value. Ord. equity issue ratio is the amount of ordinary equity issued divided by paid-in equity (size of issue in terms of current
equity). Pref. equity issue ratio is the amount of preferred equity issued divided by paid-in equity (size of issue in terms of current
equity). Dividend-payout ratio is the amount of ordinary dividends divided by annual surplus. Dividend-equity ratio is the amount of
ordinary dividends divided by paidin-equity.
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Table 4:
Basic Bylaw Characteristics by Firm Size
Small Firms Middle Firms Large Firms
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Supervisory Board 29 0.17 23 0.30 27 0.56
Board of Directors 29 1 23 0.96 27 0.93
CEO 29 0.83 23 0.91 27 0.85
Rights Issues 29 0.17 23 0.22 27 0.19
Named Person 29 0 23 0.04 27 0.07
Public Detailed Accounting 29 0.29 23 0.21 27 0.25
Dispersion of Control Rights 29 2.57 23 2.61 27 2.88
Note: The table shows the average values of the key bylaw indices within size groups. The sample of firm is split into groups according
to the 33 and 67 percentiles of paid-in equity. Supervisory Board is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a supervisory
board. Board of Directors is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a board of directors. CEO is an indicator variable
that equals one if the firm has made contractual specifications regarding a CEO in their bylaws. Rights Issues is an indicator variable
that equals one if the firm’s bylaws specify that new common equity issues must be offered for sale to existing shareholders. Named
Person is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s bylaws specify that a particular person must be CEO or on the board
of directors. Public Detailed Accounting indicates for each firm the fraction of firm-years the firm has provided detailed accounting
information to the Kierulf Handbook between the year in which it first appears in the handbook and year 1910. Dispersion of Control
Rights indicates the highest possible number of shareholders with maximum voting rights in a firm. Source: 1900 bylaws.
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Table 5:
Governance Indices: Correlation Matrix
Sup. BoD BoD Incen. BoD Acc. Disc. Anti-Tun Extra LLSV GIM
Board Index Index Index Index Index Index Index Index
Supervisory Board Dummy 1.0000
Board of Directors Index -0.0024 1.0000
BoD Incentives Index 0.1835 0.6274 1.0000
BoD Accountability Index -0.1432 0.8040 0.0413 1.0000
Disclosure Index 0.2895 0.0182 0.1735 -0.1559 1.0000
Anti-Tunneling Index -0.6204 0.0030 -0.2313 0.1728 -0.1409 1.0000
Extraordinary Cases Index 0.3607 0.1688 0.2202 0.0484 0.1165 -0.1827 1.0000
LLSV Anti-Director Index 0.2038 0.0949 0.1011 -0.1990 0.1572 -0.2074 0.1056 1.0000
GIM (2003) General Gov. Index 0.1408 0.2263 0.2571 0.0940 0.1558 -0.3203 0.1406 -0.2214 1.0000
Note: The table shows correlations between governance indices used in the regressions. Supervisory Board Dummy equals 1 if the firm
has a shareholder supervisory board and zero otherwise. Board of Directors Index has minimum value 0 and maximum value 6. Board
of Directors Incentives Index has minimum value 0 and maximum value 3. Board of Directors Accountability Index has minimum value
0 and maximum value 3. The BoD Incentives and Accountability Indices add up to the Board of Directors Index. Disclosure Index
has minimum value 0 and maximum value 7. Anti-Tunneling Index has minimum value 0 and maximum value 3. Extraordinary Cases
Index has minimum value 0 and maximum value 5.
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Table 6:






Construction & Materials 0.03
Goods & Services 0.06
Consumer Goods
Food & Beverage 0.07








Note: The table shows estimates of the underlying average annual growth rate of each industry sector over
the period 1900–1910. Growth rates in the Basic Resources, Industrial and Consumer Goods Industries,
and Utilities are growth rates of the number workers employed in establishments in each sector (source:
Norwegian Statistical Bureau Historical Yearbooks). The growth rate in the telecommunications sector is
the growth rate in the number of telephone apparatus in Oslo (source: Account of Oslo Town’s Trade,
Industry, and Shipping Yearbooks). The growth rate in the retail sector is the growth rate in the number of
business permits granted in Oslo (source: Account of Oslo Town’s Trade, Industry, and Shipping Yearbooks).
The growth rate in the real estate sector is the growth rate in the number of building permits granted in
Oslo (source: Account of Oslo Town’s Trade, Industry, and Shipping Yearbooks).
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Table 7:
Inclusive and Exclusive Firms by Industry
Firms in Top Third of Sample
All Dispersion of Stock Size
Firms Control Rights (Exclusive
(Inclusive firms) firms)
Basic Resources 14 2 10
Industrials
Construction & Materials 2 2
Goods & Services 15 7 5
Consumer Goods
Food & Beverage 15 3 4




Travel & Leisure 11 7 1
Telecommunications 3 2 1
Utilities 2 2
Real Estate 4 2 1
Total 79 27 29
Note: The table shows the distribution of inclusive and exclusive firms onto industries. Inclusive firms are
defined as firms where the dispersion of control rights lie in the top 33 percent of the distribution. Exclusive
firms are defined as firms whose share size lies in the 33 percent of the distribution.
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Table 8:
Bylaw Characteristics in Inclusive and Exclusive Firms: Test of Differences in Means
Control Rights Dispersion Share Size
Top Bottom t-test Top Bottom t-test
Third Third of diff. Third Third of diff.
Dispersion of Control Rights 82.9 3.13 4.34 16.0 66.6 –2.34
(18.0) (0.44) (7.0) (22.7)
Ord. Share Size 438 1282 –3.24 2226 267 5.34
(52.5) (260) (318) (25)
Initial Firm Size 50.6 45.7 0.38 55.0 28.9 2.13
(7.80) (10.3) (9.78) (5.78)
Industry Growth 0.035 0.037 –0.29 0.04 0.03 0.91
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Fixed Assets Ratio 0.74 0.72 0.35 0.69 0.75 –0.69
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Rights Issues-Dummy 0.19 0.08 1.16 0.24 0.14 0.93
(0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Name Shares-Dummy 0.70 0.92 –2.09 0.90 0.68 1.95
(0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10)
Ord. Share Issues Ratio 0.006 0.005 –0.23 0.007 0.006 0.16
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Supervisory Board-Dummy 0.63 0.19 3.54 0.03 0.50 –4.53
(0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.11)
BoD Index 4.50 3.96 2.00 4.34 4.05 1.08
(0.16) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19)
BoD Incentives Index 2.11 1.80 1.93 1.90 2.05 –0.88
(0.08) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12)
BoD Accountability Index 2.38 2.16 1.07 2.45 2.00 2.21
(0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16)
Information Index 3.66 3.46 0.68 3.29 3.44 –0.49
(0.21) (0.20) (0.18) (0.25)
Anti-Tunneling Index 0.89 1.65 –2.37 1.97 1.14 2.58
(0.22) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24)
Extraordinary Cases Index 2.27 1.66 3.54 1.65 2.09 –2.55
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
Dividend Payout Ratio 0.48 0.58 –0.97 0.55 0.50 0.39
(0.06) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07)
Obs. 27 27 29 22
Firms are split into bottom third and top third according to the 33 and 67 percentiles respectively.
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Table 9:
Bylaw Characteristics by Firm Size and Industry Growth: Test of Differences in Means
Initial Firm Size Industry Growth
Top Bottom t-test Top Bottom t-test
Third Third of diff. Third Third of diff.
Dispersion of Control Rights 37.4 24.6 1.12 29.9 44.8 –0.90
(8.71) (7.52) (6.73) (15.3)
Ord. Share Size 922 1232 –0.79 935 1114 –0.56
(209) (315) (178) (268)
Initial Firm Size 85.8 15.7 8.45 51.6 42.6 0.88
(8.70) (1.60) (7.27) (7.04)
Industry Growth 0.04 0.04 0.56 0.07 0.01 28.8
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
Fixed Assets Ratio 0.77 0.64 2.02 0.69 0.77 –1.41
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Rightsissues-Dummy 0.15 0.16 –0.13 0.17 0.24 –0.65
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Bearer Shares-Dummy 0.85 0.81 0.45 0.83 0.85 –0.27
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Ord. Share Issues Ratio 0.006 0.003 1.16 0.012 0.003 2.21
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Supervisory Board-Dummy 0.59 0.16 3.75 0.43 0.35 0.63
(0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
BoD Index 4.15 4.16 –0.03 4.37 4.03 1.46
(0.21) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17)
BoD Incentives Index 1.85 1.87 –0.16 2.03 1.81 –1.51
(0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12)
BoD Accountability Index 2.31 2.29 0.09 2.34 2.21 0.72
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Information Index 3.85 3.13 2.33 3.79 3.20 2.39
(0.20) (0.23) (0.18) (0.16)
Tunneling Index 1.11 1.87 –2.51 1.23 1.71 –1.60
(0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22)
Extraordinary Cases Index 2.00 1.96 0.24 1.96 1.99 –0.18
(0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Dividend Payout Ratio 0.48 0.51 –0.29 0.59 0.46 1.47
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Obs. 27 31 35 34
Firms are split into bottom third and top third according to the 33 and 67 percentiles respectively.
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Table 10:
Effect of Governance Laws on Dividend-Payout
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Constant 3.28 4.58 4.09 3.34 5.07 3.12 4.46
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Board of Directors Index -0.34 -0.28
(0.04) (0.09)
Disclosure Index -0.17 0.07
(0.10) (0.34)
Anti-Tunneling Index -0.19 0.01
(0.02) (0.89)
Extraordinary Cases Index -0.87 -0.25
(0.00) (0.12)
Supervisory Board-Dummy -0.07 -0.18
(0.64) (0.47)
Market-to-Nominal Share Value 1.37 1.63 1.24 1.45 1.60 1.45 1.40
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Age 1.16 2.91 0.42 0.47 1.80 1.32 3.77
(0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Initial Equity 1.08 -8.98 1.68 6.99 -4.65 1.24 -12.00
(0.29) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.46) (0.00)
Obs. 528 520 528 528 528 528 520
Pseudo R-squared 0.28 0.53 0.13 0.27 0.34 0.24 0.75
Note: The table shows regression results of a two-step GLS estimator (weighted least squares) where the
first step estimates a standard error for each firm, and, in the second step, observations for each firm are
weighted with the inverse of its estimated standard error. The dependent variable is the log of 1 plus the
dividend payout ratio measured in percent. Firm Age is firm age the first year it enters the sample. The
coefficient is multiplied by 10. Initial Equity is the equity size in the year of the firm’s bylaws, measured in
billion 2009 kroner. Market-to-Nominal Value is the firm’s stock price divided by its nominal value. The
governance indices are described in Table 1. p-values in parentheses. Sample period: 1985–1910.
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Table 11:
Effect of Governance Laws on Dividend-Payout: Exclusive Firms
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Constant 4.46 4.49 5.15 4.96 4.63 4.44
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top Third Share Size Group-Dummy 3.55 3.54 2.22 4.34 0.69
(0.19) (0.13) (0.06) (0.00) (0.28)
Dummy × Board Index -0.88
(0.17)
Dummy × Disclosure Index -0.99
(0.11)
Dummy × Anti-Tunneling Index -0.87
(0.03)
Dummy × Extraord. Cases Index -2.40
(0.00)
Dummy × Supervisory Board 0.22
(0.66)
Board of Directors Index -0.28 -0.08 -0.30 -0.09 -0.22 -0.14
(0.09) (0.55) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.14)
Disclosure Index 0.07 -0.18 0.22 0.12 0.17 0.21
(0.34) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02) (0.03)
Anti-Tunneling Index 0.01 -0.10 -0.35 -0.19 -0.34 -0.42
(0.89) (0.37) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
Extraordinary Cases Index -0.25 -0.25 -0.23 -0.54 -0.17 -0.31
(0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.32) (0.07)
Supervisory Board-Dummy -0.18 0.56 -0.45 0.07 -0.20 -0.47
(0.47) (0.07) (0.09) (0.82) (0.36) (0.14)
Market-to-Nominal Share Value 1.40 1.39 1.55 1.32 1.21 1.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Age 3.77 1.81 0.66 1.17 1.25 1.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06)
Initial Equity -12.00 -4.77 -5.83 -11.81 -7.76 -3.62
(0.00) (0.19) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.30)
Obs. 520 520 520 520 520 520
Pseudo R-squared 0.75 0.23 0.28 0.21 0.31 0.35
Note: The table shows regression results of a two-step GLS estimator (weighted least squares) where the
first step estimates a standard error for each firm, and, in the second step, observations for each firm are
weighted with the inverse of its estimated standard error. The dependent variable is the log of 1 plus the
dividend payout ratio measured in percent. Firm Age is firm age the first year it enters the sample. The
coefficient is multiplied by 10. Initial Equity is the equity size in the year of the firm’s bylaws, measured
in billion 2009 kroner. Market-to-Nominal Value is the firm’s stock price divided by its nominal value.
Dispersion of Control Rights measures the highest possible number of shareholders with maximum voting
power in the firm. The governance indices are described in Table 1. Dividend-payout information is not
available for all firms in the sample. Hence, the number of firms in the regression is 57, of which 12 firms
belong to the top third of firms with largest stock sizes out of the entire sample of 79 firms. p-values in
parentheses. Sample period: 1985–1910.
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Table 12:
Effect of Governance Laws on Dividend-Payout: Inclusive Firms
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Constant 4.46 5.53 7.02 5.79 8.09 6.73
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Top Third Dispersion Group-Dummy -0.44 -0.27 0.21 -4.56 -0.32
(0.71) (0.71) (0.56) (0.00) (0.56)
Dummy × Board Index 0.22
(0.43)
Dummy × Disclosure Index 0.12
(0.52)
Dummy × Anti-Tunneling Index -0.12
(0.43)
Dummy × Extraord. Cases Index 2.23
(0.00)
Dummy × Supervisory Board 0.18
(0.75)
Board of Directors Index -0.28 -0.33 -0.28 -0.13 -0.62 -0.05
(0.09) (0.03) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.57)
Disclosure Index 0.07 0.10 -0.15 -0.00 0.03 -0.05
(0.34) (0.18) (0.19) (0.99) (0.70) (0.63)
Anti-Tunneling Index 0.01 -0.30 -0.45 -0.29 0.04 -0.72
(0.89) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.57) (0.00)
Extraordinary Cases Index -0.25 -0.50 -0.49 -0.70 -1.34 -0.51
(0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Supervisory Board-Dummy -0.18 -0.33 -0.67 -0.23 0.47 -1.35
(0.47) (0.14) (0.00) (0.41) (0.01) (0.00)
Market-to-Nominal Share Value 1.40 1.80 1.52 1.62 1.27 1.75
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Age 3.77 0.45 0.11 0.13 2.14 -0.65
(0.00) (0.30) (0.76) (0.75) (0.00) (0.27)
Initial Equity -12.00 0.15 0.61 -0.89 -7.72 -4.23
(0.00) (0.90) (0.68) (0.56) (0.00) (0.12)
Obs. 520 520 520 520 520 520
Pseudo R-squared 0.75 0.42 0.37 0.40 0.53 0.40
Note: The table shows regression results of a two-step GLS estimator (weighted least squares) where the
first step estimates a standard error for each firm, and, in the second step, observations for each firm are
weighted with the inverse of its estimated standard error. The dependent variable is the log of 1 plus the
dividend payout ratio measured in percent. Firm Age is firm age the first year it enters the sample. The
coefficient is multiplied by 10. Initial Equity is the equity size in the year of the firm’s bylaws, measured
in billion 2009 kroner. Market-to-Nominal Value is the firm’s stock price divided by its nominal value.
Dispersion of Control Rights measures the highest possible number of shareholders with maximum voting
power in the firm. The governance indices are described in Table 1. Dividend-payout information is not
available for all firms in the sample. Hence, the number of firms in the regression is 57, of which 24 firms
belong to the top third of firms with largest dispersion of shareholder control out of the entire sample of 79
firms. p-values in parentheses. Sample period: 1985–1910.
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Table 13:
Determinants of Seasoned Common Equity Issues: Governance Indices
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
Firm Age -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.14 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 0.01
(0.74) (0.74) (0.71) (0.64) (0.98) (0.74) (0.81) (0.97)
Initial Equity 0.03 0.00 -0.25 -0.16 0.62 -0.00 0.61 0.25
(0.98) (1.00) (0.84) (0.90) (0.62) (1.00) (0.65) (0.84)
Market-to-Nominal Share Value 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.15
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07)
Board of Directors Index -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(0.82) (0.59) (0.68)
Disclosure Index 0.08 0.08 0.07
(0.08) (0.09) (0.14)
Anti-Tunneling Index -0.04 -0.07 -0.06
(0.31) (0.18) (0.20)
Extraordinary Cases Index 0.16 0.19 0.17
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Supervisory Board-Dummy 0.02 -0.25 -0.17
(0.89) (0.09) (0.25)
Constant 0.26 0.32 -0.00 0.34 -0.10 0.25 -0.12 -0.12
(0.00) (0.21) (0.99) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) (0.73) (0.70)
Obs. 143 140 143 143 143 143 140 140
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.08
Note: The table shows regression results from a two-period panel least squares regressions where variables
in each period are measured as averages over the years 1886-1904 respectively 1905-1910. The results in
model M8 is a from a two-step industry-weighted GLS estimator (weighted least squares) where the first
step estimates a standard error for each industry, and, in the second step, observations for each firm are
weighted with the inverse of the estimated standard error for the industry it belongs to. The dependent
variable is the value of seasoned ordinary equity issues, measured in percent of previous year’s ultimo-period
value of paid-in equity. Firm Age is firm age the first year it enters the sample. The coefficient is multiplied
by 10. Initial Equity is the equity size in the year of the firm’s bylaws, measured in billion 2009 kroner.
Market-to-Nominal Value is the firm’s stock price divided by its nominal value. Supervisory Board Index,
Board of Directors Index, CEO Index, Disclosure Index, Anti-Tunneling Index, and General Governance
Index are described in Table 1. p-values in parentheses. Sample period: 1985–1910.
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1 Appendix B Tables
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Table B-1:
Contractual features Related to Board and CEO Structure
A. Managing Board Structure (Excluding CEO) C. Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
Proportion of contracts that require appointment Proportion of contracts that specify the hiring of a CEO 87.3
of a managing board 97.5 Among contracts mentioning CEO:
Median number of directors 3 CEO must be shareholder 5.8
Median term of directors (years) 3 CEO on managing board 41.8
Among firms requiring Board of Directors: When CEO on managing board, he is chairman 17.9
Directors elected by general assembly 74.0 Daily decision making delegated to CEO 78.3
Directors elected by Supervisory Board 26.0 CEO takes instructions from managing board 69.1
Directors must be local residents 18.2 CEO represents firm in 3rdparty contracts 29.1
Directors must be shareholders 85.1 29.1
Directors takes part in daily management 87.0
Directors represent firm in 3rd party contracts 61.0
Directors receive extra pay for performance 37.7
B. Supervisory Board Structure D. Insiders by Contract
Proportion of contracts that require appointment Proportion of full sample of bylaws that require that a
of a supervisory board 35.4 specific named individual serve:
Median number of supervisory members 12 As a director on managing board 5.1
Median term of supervisory members (years) 2 As a member of supervisory board 1.3
Among contracts requiring supervisory board: As CEO 1.3
Members elected by shareholders 96.4 Total insiders by contract —–
Members must be a shareholder 89.3 7.7
Members must be local resident 17.9
Members receive extra pay-for-performance 0.0
Note: The table reports key protections in percent of firm sample unless otherwise indicated. For YES/NO variables we register
“NO” if a firm’s bylaws does not explicitly mention the issue in question. In Panel C, “managing” board comprises both the Board of
Directors and the Supervisory Board in firms that have a two-tired board structure in place.
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Table B-2:
Contractual features Related to Transferability of Shares,
New Share Issuances, and Disclosure Policies
A. Transferability of Shares and Share Issuances
Proportion of contracts requiring shares be registered
in name of the owner 98.5
Proportion of contracts requiring director approval
before shares can be transferred to new owner 21.9
Proportion of contracts specifying procedure for new
share issuances 49.4
Proportion of contracts requiring a rights offering
prior to issuance 19.0
B. Disclosure Policies
Proportion of contracts requiring financial statements
be disclosed to shareholders prior to annual meeting 68.4
Median time ahead of annual meeting that financials
are disclosed to shareholders (in days) 14
Maximum time 3
Minimum time 60
Mechanism for disclosing financial statements
Sent to shareholders through mail 6.7
Made available at company office 93.3
Published in newspaper 3.3
Not specified 62.0
Proportion of contracts stating that annual meeting
will be publicly announced in newspapers ahead of meeting 70.9
Median number of newspapers in which annual
meeting is announced 2
Note: The table reports key protections in percent of firm sample unless otherwise indicated. For YES/NO
variables we register “NO” if a firm’s bylaws does not explicitly mention the issue in question.
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Table B-3:
Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Shareholder Voting Rules I
A. Allocation of Decision Rights
Approval of Approval of
acquisitions borrowing
Appointment and sales of Approval of against fixed Payment of
Allocated to: Director salary Hiring of CEO CEO Salary of auditor fixed assets liquidation assets dividends
Management board 2.5 54.4 39.2 7.6 8.9 0.0 7.6 8.9
Supervisor board 21.5 7.6 15.2 27.8 7.6 0.0 7.6 15.2
Combination of managing
and supervisory board 0.0 16.5 11.4 1.3 10.1 3.8 8.9 10.1
Vote by shareholders 27.8 5.1 8.9 59.5 53.2 87.3 44.3 36.7
Fixed in contract 27.8 0.0 3.8 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 27.8
Not specified 20.3 15.2 20.3 3.8 19.0 8.9 31.6 1.3
B. Shareholder Voting Majorities Required for Certain Decisions
Approve
acquisitions
and sales of Approve of new Decide to Change
fixed assets equity issuance liquidate charter laws
Percent of votes at meeting:
Mean 53.2 58.0 65.1 63.9
Median 51.0 51.0 67.0 67.0
Min 51.0 51.0 51.0 51.0
Max 67.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
Number of contracts reporting: 43 45 77 79
Required meeting quorum:
Mean 47.3 54.1 57.2 75.1
Median 50.0 67.0 50.0 50.0
Min 25.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Max 67.0 67.0 88.0 75.0
Number of contracts reporting: 6 13 63 50
Note: The table reports key protections in percent of firm sample unless otherwise indicated. For YES/NO variables we register “NO”
if a firm’s bylaws does not explicitly mention the issue in question.
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Table B-4:
Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Shareholder Voting Rules II
Shareholder Ability to Put Up Special Proposals and Call Extraordinary Meetings
Put up special Call Call
proposals at extraordinary extraordinary
annual shareholder shareholder
meeting, number meeting, proportion meeting, number
of shareholders of equity capital of shareholders
Percent of votes at meeting:
Mean 2.67 23.0 21.4
Median 1 25.0 20.0
Min 1 4.2 1.0
Max 24 51.0 50.0
Number of contracts reporting: 36 51 8
Note: The table reports key protections in percent of firm sample unless otherwise indicated. For YES/NO variables we register “NO”
if a firm’s bylaws does not explicitly mention the issue in question. The requirement for calling extraordinary shareholder meetings
may be expressed in percent of equity capital or as number of shareholders. We therefore report both.
63
The CCGR Working Paper Series: Contents   
 







1/2007 Ole-Kristian Hope and John Christian Langli:   
Auditor Independence in a Private Firm and Low Litigation Risk Setting 
Revised April 2009 





1/2008 Paul Ehling:  
Risk Management with Cash and Insurance in Non-Listed Firms 






1/2009 Øyvind Norli, Charlotte Ostergaard and Ibolya Schindele:  
Liquidity and Shareholder Activism 






1/2010 Roland E. Kidwell and Arne Nygaard: 
The Dual-Agency Problem Reconsidered: A Strategic Deviance Perspective 
on the Franchise Form of Organizing 
Revised September  2010 
  
2/2010 Ole-Kristian Hope, John Christian Langli and Wayne B. Thomas:  
Agency Conflicts and Auditing in Private Firms 
March 2010 
Revised September  2010 
 
3/2010 Mohammad Abdolmohammadi, Erlend Kvaal and John Christian Langli:  
Earnings Management Priorities of Private Family Firms 
November 2010 
 
4/2010 Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme, Roni Michaely and Øyvind Norli: 





1/2011 Charlotte Ostergaard, Amir Sasson, and Bent E. Sørensen: 
The Marginal Value of Cash, Cash Flow Sensitivities, and Bank-Finance 
Shocks in Nonlisted Firms 
January 2011 
  
2/2011 Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme: 
Laddering in Initial Public Offering Allocations 
January 2011 
 
3/2011 Charlotte Ostergaard and David C. Smith: 




The Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) 
conducts research on the relationship between corporate 
governance, firm behavior, and stakeholder welfare. Our 
projects pay particular attention to the governance of closely 
held firms and family firms, and the research teams come from 
different disciplines in several countries. Financing is provided 
by private sponsors and the Research Council of Norway.  
 
 
The CCGR is organized by the Department of Financial 




Centre for Corporate Governance Research 
BI Norwegian School of Management 
Nydalsveien 37 
N-0442 OSLO 
Norway 
http://www.bi.no/ccgr 
 
 
